Online Social Networks (OSNs) have grown exponentially over the past decade. The initial use of social media for benign purposes (e.g., to socialize with friends, browse pictures and photographs, and communicate with family members overseas) has now transitioned to include malicious activities (e.g., cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare). These nefarious uses of OSNs poses a signicant threat to society, and thus requires research attention. In this exploratory work, we study activities of one deviant groups: hacker groups on social media, which we term Deviant Hacker Networks (DHN). We investigated the connection between dierent DHNs on Twitter: how they are connected, identied the powerful nodes, which nodes sourced information, and which nodes act as bridges between dierent network components. From this, we were able to identify and articulate specic examples of DHNs communicating with each other, with the goal of committing some form of deviant act online. In our work, we also attempted to bridge the gap between the empirical study of OSNs and cyber forensics, as the growth of OSNs is now bringing these two domains together, due to OSNs continuously generating vast amounts of evidentiary data.
It would be of benet to the Information Assurance (IA) domain, and its respective sub-domains, to conduct novel research on the phenomenon of deviant behavior in OSNs. One evident form of deviant behavior comes in the form of communications between black hat hacking groups on OSNs, which we term Deviant Hacker Networks (DHN) . In this preliminary work
we attempted to answer the following re- This algorithm has been tested on many real world cases such as the Saudi Arabian women's Oct26Driving campaign on Twitter (Yuce, Agarwal, Wigand, Lim, & Robinson, 2014) . Results showed that focal structures are more interactive than average individuals and more interactive than communities in the evolution of a mass protest, i.e., the interaction rate of focal structures are significantly higher than the average interaction rate of random sets of individuals, and the number of retweets, mentions, and replies in- FSA has also been used in the case of the Dragoon Ride Exercise to discover the most inuential set of botnets or the seeders of information used to disseminate the propaganda (bots that by working together profoundly impact propaganda dissemination) (Al-khateeb & Agarwal, Under review).
EXPLORATORY WORK

Data Collection
A seed data set was created by manually searching for hacker accounts on Twitter. • We obtained 1,405 Replies to edges:
these are a special form of the mention edges that occur when the user's name is at the very start of a tweet.
• We obtained 76,928 Friends and Followers edges: these are the edges created when a user follows or followed by other users.
The network also contained 6 isolates (one node alone not connected to any other nodes) and 1 big connected component (everyone is connected to some other nodes).
The big component had 58, 114 unique nodes and 87, 318 edges. The network we collected also had a maximum geodesic distance (Diameter) = 9 which meant the network is quite large (it takes a maximum of 9 steps to get from one side of the network to the other) but also the network has an average geodesic distance = 3.8 which portrays that information is likely to reach all the nodes in the network quite quickly (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) .
Results & Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results we obtained from applying social network analysis on the collected data, then discuss the results we obtained form applying FSA (en et al., 2016).
Social Network Analysis of the
Data
As mentioned earlier, we collected the Twitter network of the identied DHN accounts.
By examining their overall network we were able to identify the most used hashtags (See By examining their communication network (Agent X Agent Network of users with mentions, replies, and tweets), we were able to identify the accounts they interacted with the most, the accounts that tweeted the most, and the accounts that helped spread their messages by retweeting it. Observing and monitoring this communication network of DHNs was key to understanding the content they were trying to spread e.g., a message or propaganda.
We then examined their social network (an Agent X Agent network of friends/followers of the hacking groups). This enabled us to identify the source of information accounts (accounts who have top out-degree centrality), the accounts that receive the information (accounts who have top in-degree centrality), and the accounts that work as bridges between the dierent parts of the network (accounts who have top betweenness centrality). Studying the social network was important to understand the roles of the nodes in the network (e.g., bridges, seeders of information, etc.) and the coorc 2016 ADFSL dination strategies these groups followed to spread their message to their audience
FSA Findings
Here, we applied the FSA algorithm on the communication network and the social network to nd the most coordinating set of nodes instead of single node analysis.
FSA is a recursive modularity-based algorithm. Modularity is a network structural measure that evaluates cohesiveness of a network (Girvan & Newman, 2002) . The FSA algorithm works in two steps: Bottom-up agglomeration step: the FSA algorithm will stitch the candidate focal structures, i.e., the highly interconnected focal structure or the focal structures that have the highest similarity values are stitched together, then the process iterates until the highest similarity of all sibling pairs is less than a given threshold value.
The similarity between two structures is measured using the well-known Jaccard's coecient (en et al., 2016; Jaccard, 1912) which results in a value between 0 and 1 (where 1 means the two networks are identical and 0 means the two networks are not similar at all). (en et al., 2016) .
We ran the FSA algorithm on the communication network (see Figure 2 ) which enabled us to identify the set of nodes that are communicating together at the highest frequencies. Running FSA here resulted in 8
FSAs (groups) which contain 58 nodes total (the number of nodes in each FSA is shown in Table 1 , FSA with ID = 1 has the highest number of nodes i.e., 18 nodes). 8 The FSA version we used is available online at http://www.merjek.com (guest account -username: merjek, password: merjek123)
Proposed Framework
We propose a framework (See Figure 4) that can be used to discover the relationship between the deviant groups e.g., hacking groups. The framework starts with seed knowledge (e.g., accounts or keywords used by the group) which is usually provided by domain experts.
Second, data collection with Twitter API (in our case we used NodeXl Discussion: the most inuential set of nodes can be identied as our results showed using the FSA algorithm.
Additionally, we articulated the need to bridge the gap between social network analysis and cyber forensic techniques to uncover hidden relationships between deviant groups, and obtain forensicallyrelevant data. The results showed a strong connection between those dierent DHNs through their social network and also a high volume of communication seemed to occur between them. This suggests a sophisticated ability to coordinate deviant acts through their social media communication vectors. By applying FSA we were able to identify the most inuential set of nodes in the observed social and communication networks. By using SNA we were able to identify the powerful nodes, bridges between dierent network components, the hashtags/keywords/bigrams they use, who is disseminating the most information, etc.
For future work, we plan to analyze the message contents of these groups, their sentiments, and how their followers' sentiments change over time. By monitoring their sentiments and communications, a predictive model of an attack or organized deviant act can be developed.
